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Identity and cosmopolitics
In the literature of psychology, social psychology, 
sociology and anthropology of the past three decades 
we have witnessed a great amount of emphasis on 
identity, identity dynamics and extreme identity claims 
(in religious terms, in ethnicity categories or in cultural 
profiles, apart from nationalist concepts). I will not give 
an overview here.
It is my conviction that we are only beginning to 
understand what ‘person’, ‘identity’ let alone ‘meaning 
of life’ can mean for the different cultural traditions of 
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Abstract: Cosmopolitics is growing as an alternative to identity battles, a critical form of 
cosmopolitanism. This contribution claims that such an alternative will only be feasible with 
individuals as dialogical selves. Ethnographic interviews with Muslims and Christians of different 
generations yield insights into their notions of personhood. Different notions of person are 
then checked against the new predicament of cosmopolitics in urban settings. The traditional 
notion of ‘full person’ can be distinguished from that of ‘partial persons’, subjacent to the 
views of the dialogical self. Educational and social benefits of the ‘partial person’ concept are 
outlined. Qualitative research into the perception of the person as a ‘partial person’ opens 
the way to an appreciation of the dialogical self approach, especially in the context of an ever 
more urbanized humanity. Against that background, cosmopolitics is being re-discussed as a 
possible avenue for a global society. 
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Resumo: A cosmopolítica, como uma forma crítica do cosmopolitismo, está crescendo como 
uma alternativa às lutas identitárias. Trata-se de uma alternativa que só será viável se os 
indivíduos se entenderem como selfs dialógicos. As entrevistas etnográficas realizadas com 
muçulmanos e cristãos, de diferentes gerações, forneceram insights sobre suas noções de 
personhood. Verificam-se noções inovadoras de pessoa diante da nova situação da cosmopolítica 
em ambientes urbanos. A noção tradicional de “pessoa plena” pode ser diferenciada da de 
“pessoas parciais”, subjacente às visões do self dialógico. No texto, é delineada a produtividade 
para os campos educacional e social do uso do conceito de “pessoa parcial”. A pesquisa 
qualitativa sobre a percepção da pessoa como “pessoa parcial” abre possibilidades para uma 
apreciação da abordagem dialógica do self, especialmente no contexto de uma humanidade 
cada vez mais urbanizada. Em oposição a esse cenário, a cosmopolítica volta a ser discutida 
como uma possível via para a sociedade global.
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the world. Hence, I cannot in any way make uncritical 
claims for universality on any of these topics. Rather, I 
will suggest a hypothetical perspective which is certainly 
unconventional, but which holds promises for a compara-
tive study of these phenomena. Both as an anthropologist 
and as a humanistically inspired researcher I deliberately 
and explicitly choose for a particular conceptual frame.
Identity
In the words of Stuart Hall (1997) identity can refer 
to two different, and mutually complementary concepts. 
Either it designates a state of being, which then can 
be claimed by a group or community, or it points to a 
process of identity formation. In the present era (which 
could be called post-postmodernist, Hermans, 2004), 
both interpretations can clash: e.g. fundamentalists and 
nationalists seem to stress the unchangability (or even 
the ‘natural kind’ status) of their identity, while many 
urbanites today change beliefs or denominational prac-
tices with evolutions in their contexts.
The hypothesis I formulate on this issue is that the 
continuous and worldwide urbanization in the world 
promotes a bifurcation between a religious or doctrinal 
rather fixed life stance (‘being’) on the one hand and a 
series of varying lifestyles (‘process’) on the other hand. 
The subjects I interviewed all live in the densely urban-
ized area of Western Europe (Pinxten e Dikomitis, 2006). 
This entails that they are probably more confronted with 
technological innovation and impact than groups living 
in traditional, more isolated contexts (desert or mountain 
peoples, for example). I take for granted that a majority 
living in the European space can be characterized by 
means of the three types of ‘self’ of Hermans (2004), 
since they were reared in one of the three religions of 
the book or in the Enlightenment reaction against them. 
This does not automatically hold for those residents in 
today’s Europe who come from other places in the world 
(Asia, Africa, Native America).
Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism is very popular in anthropology 
these days. The term needs to be qualified. The traditional 
meaning of the notion dates from Ancient Greece, but 
is better known in the Christian and the Enlightenment 
version (Kinneging, 2003). Throughout history and right 
up to the Human Rights version, the term refers to a view 
developed by western cultural groups about the proper 
way to be and to organize the world. This view is locally 
discussed and made public, and then proclaimed as the 
best way for humankind. In doing so, one in fact attributes 
universal validity to a local and culture specific project. 
In contradistinction with this view the new cosmopolitan-
ism I advocate breaks away from this tradition. Rather, 
cosmopolitan validity will have to be decided upon in a 
comparative mentality (Nader, 1994): the world is and 
remains culturally (and religiously) diverse, and compara-
tive research is the only type of study that can do justice 
to this situation. Reaching a cosmopolitan perspective on 
values and world views will involve continuous negotia-
tion and the hypothesis is that it will most probably take 
the form of a provisional equilibrium of unity in diversity. 
In recent years the alternative term of ‘cosmopolitics’ 
has been suggested to capture a double and supposedly 
antagonistic view on identity. Cosmopolitics acknowl-
edges the need for universal rules and understandings 
(as in cosmopolitanism), but seeks to integrate it with 
communitarian positions. In other words, cosmopolitics 
grants that humankind is one and needs to find common 
ways or norms to live together, but at the same time it 
stresses that differences obtain and should be recognized 
and respected. It can be seen as the modern version of 
the old ideal of unity in diversity. 
Personhood
Again, in the western tradition I understand that the 
person is understood basically as an integrated whole, 
which is built up over time. It is believed that a person 
is built up through education in the religious and cultural 
canons of the community. In focusing on the religious 
or life stance education of a person the ideal seems to 
be that: (i) the person is gradually more and more ‘filled 
in’ as he passes through different rites of passage. After 
birth the Jewish, the Christian and the Islamic community 
give the newborn a name and have elders take a vow 
to the god covering for the child (i.e., the institute of 
godfather and godmother); with puberty the child takes 
a vow vis-à-vis god and thus shows its coming of age as 
a religiously conscious person. With adulthood marriage 
and child birth fills in the person even more. (ii) Typical 
for the Mediterranean tradition is that the person seems 
to be conceived as a full and exclusive person. That is, 
there is no room for other aspects of personhood which 
would fall outside of, let alone be conflicting with the re-
ligious mould one has been educated in. Hermans (2004) 
speaks of the pre-modern self with an emcompassing 
view and educational practice filled in by the doctrine 
of the religion(s): one becomes a Jew, a Christian or 
a Muslim over years and the result is a person who is 
total and sufficient in himself. Cognitive, corporeal and 
moral categories are all defined by the religious tradition, 
and there is no room for alternatives. In practice, one is 
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either a Jew/Christian/Muslim or one is a heathen. The 
‘multiple personality’ is firmly held to be an aberration, 
which is severely condemned (as heresy, blasphemy and 
the like). If not, it is a psychiatric syndrome (Hermans, 
2004) in conflict with the ideal of the fully integrated and 
‘consistent’ person. I call this notion of person the 100% 
version. It is relevant  to mention that only recently did 
anthropologists come to the conclusion that heresy and 
blasphemy do not obtain in most other religious tradi-
tions of the world (Pinxten, 2010), yielding the idea that 
the 100% version may not be the ideal for these cultures. 
Also, in the post-postmodern world of the contemporary 
urbanite a kind of soft multiple self appears to become 
more popular, called the ‘dialogical self’ by Hermans 
(2004). It is obvious that postmodernism can hardly be 
envisioned in a mechanistic world; without doubt the 
information technology of the past decades has triggered 
a tremendous opening of perspectives, and without doubt 
reduced the control by one authority on the development 
of an integrated self to a large extent. So, although it is 
difficult to claim that technology produces this or that 
self, it is undoubtedly so that present informational 
technology led to the impossibility of classical closed 
authorities to continue their hold on people’s minds. 
Instead a flood of information has spread over people, 
leading to wide centrifugal circles. That some persons 
feel drowned by such flood and narrow down again to 
a simple and straightforward, maybe a unique authority 
is not in contradiction with the former statement. Even 
then, the ‘new faithful’ will differ in their mindset from 
their former colleagues: they will be ‘happy few’ rather 
than majority and they may be driven to be more defen-
sive and hence tougher in attitude than their forerunners. 
The mere availability of information and alternative 
views through present-day information technology will 
be a permanent stress factor for such selves, I claim.  
The hypothesis I formulate on this dimension is that 
the 100% version of personhood which was more ten-
able in the context of a presumably monocultural context 
(exclusively Jewish or Christian or Muslim), might 
best be substituted by the ideal of the ‘partial person’ 
(50% person) in the present urbanized world, allowing 
for a ‘dialogical self’ strategy of community building. 
This would be the third precondition to think the new 
cosmopolitanism.
The empirical data
(i) M. Van Hecke who is chief executive of a vast 
and powerful catholic educational network (governing 
some 80% of all schools and responsible for the same 
percentage of pupils in Flanders, Belgium) declared in 
an interview and in debates that Muslim children are 
welcome in the catholic schools, provided they abided 
with the rule to follow courses in the catholic catechism. 
On that condition they could be allowed one hour of 
Islamic teaching as well. She explained that choice or 
offer by saying that it “is necessary to have your own 
religious identity first in order to be able to meet another 
religion”. Since Muslim children do not know enough 
about Christianity, according to Van Hecke, they should 
be taught that religion at school as a condition for being 
allowed in the school.
(ii) When interviewing Muslim adults in Flanders and 
The Netherlands over the past decade, I was often told 
that, although I was appreciated as a good person ‘it was 
a pity you lack the essential dimension of religion. That 
way you can never be a full human being’. 
On one occasion, I advanced the opinion that ecolog-
ical-economical decisions to be made on a global scale 
in the next decade or so (the global warning/extinction 
of resources threats) were hampered by the exclusivist 
positions of the Mediterranean religions, which strive for 
universalization of their message instead of searching 
for an “entente” with people from a variety of religious 
and cultural backgrounds. The attitude of the Vatican, 
and some Islamic countries at the Cairo UN conference 
in 2000 on demographic issues illustrates this point: 
they tried to prohibit UN decisions because they were 
perceived as conflicting with their views on humankind 
(e.g. abortion, the use of condoms, etc.). A self-declared 
left-wing  Muslim leader in the particular debate I was 
attending  said he was offended by my line of arguing 
and declared, with the right hand on the Koran, that none 
of my arguments would be necessary ‘provided people 
would follow the ecological rules which are laid down 
in this book’. He was unaware of the fact that his answer 
illustrated precisely the point I was making.
(iii) A third example stems from a ‘green’ politician, 
posing as a progressive party member of Turkish im-
migrant origin, who claimed in a meeting she organized 
on the issue that: ‘it is a Human Right for Muslims to 
be buried in a cemetery which is properly organized and 
exclusive for Muslims. It should be separated from other 
burying grounds by trees, as is specified in the Koran’. 
That the local city elders did not meet her on this point, 
because ‘segregation right into the graves has a long, and 
despicable history in Europe’ (mayor Termont, 2008) 
and all requirements of Islamic burial were pragmati-
cally met in the rulings of the democratically elected 
city council, was seen by her as a violation of the rights 
of Muslims. When I told her that he was in fact asking 





(iv) A fourth example is drawn from many interviews 
and conversations with freethinkers in Belgium and The 
Netherlands. Especially the collapse of the multicultural 
society in the latter country was followed by a ritualistic 
murder on filmer-jounalist Theo Van Gogh (in 2006) and 
the commotion around the Danish cartoons on Moham-
med. Freethinkers from Belgium and The Netherlands 
were consequently split in two groups: the conservatives 
increasingly came to rely on a so-called more radical 
view abiding with French ‘laicité’ (e.g. Cliteur, 2007), 
and the progressive group proposed to look for an up-
dating of old positions in the light of the tremendous 
diversification of religious traditions in our region. 
The former group argues for a stricter separation of reli-
gion and state, yielding ‘passive pluralism’ at the most. 
That is to say, let Catholics be schooled in their religion, 
separated from Protestants, Muslims, Jews, Freethinkers 
and so on. Schools and society as such should be ‘neu-
tral’, going for a universal moral code for all, unham-
pered by any religions choices (Cliteur, o.c.). The rulings 
banning the headscarf emanate from this group. The 
second group of freethinkers claims that ‘activ pluralism’ 
should be installed, both in schools and in public offices. 
That is to say, one should educate people and engage in 
societal initiatives by knowing about and being able to 
interculturally behave with difference. Interculturality 
rather than mono- or multiculturality obtains.
(v) The final example is drawn from systematic 
interviews with some 200 adolescents (age 21-24) in 
Flanders2, although not one clear picture emerged from 
this set of interviews, it appears that the adolescents are 
composing different sorts of mixtures from the varied 
offer of today. A large majority of them adopt a sort of 
‘custom Christianity’: although less than half of them 
believe in the existence of a god with a revealed will, 
roughly 80% will attend mass for baptism, marriage 
and funerals. When asked about their belonging to one 
or another religion, life stance group or lifestyle group 
a variety of answers obtained. A small majority declared 
that lifestyles are undeep, shallow and can be adopted 
regardless of one’s worldview. The same group, joined 
by some other adolescents, would hold that one is either 
a believer in one or another religion or a humanist-
freethinker. The choice between these two has nothing to 
do, however, with the lifestyle or lifestyles one engages 
in. The latter speaks about clothing, leisure activities, 
tastes, social values and according to the interviewees 
these choices can be made next to and independent of the 
belief systems. A tiny minority of the group (less than 10 
in the total sample of over 200) claimed that they took 
a stand in life by adopting a lifestyle first and foremost. 
For them, a lifestyle is a substitute for a religion. It is to 
be noted that these views of the adolescent group seem to 
break away on important points from those in the former 
examples: mixture of beliefs and practices from differ-
ent meaning systems is regarded rather pragmatically as 
unproblematic; being selective in adopting beliefs and 
in picking and choosing lifestyle options does not pose 
a problem either; and it is unclear whether or to what 
extent a rule of consistency or of ‘full personhood’ is 
still held onto.
(vi) Empirical data from other sources are not abun-
dant, but they underscore that similar trends are emerging 
with adolescents and young adults around the world:
-  In a rare comparative study Kronjee (2006) 
makes the point that American inspired life-
styles become dominant in the USA and in 
Europe, yielding a different status for religions. 
The latter becomes a surplus for particular 
choices in life (death, birth, marriage) rather 
than the foundation for major questions on the 
meaning of life, or on issues of quality of life 
(choice of jobs, partner, family planning, sex, 
etc.). On the other hand some groups seem to 
withdraw in a stricter religious or life stance 
perspective, yielding a growth of fundamen-
talist groups who aim for political power. In a 
somewhat similar line of thought one can argue 
that the privatization of religion in Europe pro-
duces the co-existence of various stands next 
to each other.
-  Although the organizations which promote 
humanism and atheism prove to be relatively 
unknown in Belgium and The Netherlands (Cra-
mer, 1999, and M. Leentvaar-Braakman, 1992) 
the values of a secular society and the principles 
of an autonomous moral individual (in contrast 
to the heteronomy of the moral stand in a theo-
cratic worldview) prevail. In a recent empirical 
study the role of churches in discussions about 
major ethical issues such as euthanasia proves 
to be ever more dwindling (Verté, 2006). At the 
European level, the general trend found in the 
latter study is clearly corroborated by Lambert’s 
comparative sociological study: “On the rise 
are: religious faith as a quality to encourage 
to learn at home, attachment to ceremonies 
for birth, marriage, and death, the feeling that 
2 I am grateful to my students (2007-2008) who helped me in this. Over 50 of them worked in groups conducting the interviews.
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churches bring answers to spiritual needs […] 
belief in life after death (from 38% to 44%), in 
hell (from 16% tot 23%), and in heaven (from 
30% to 35%). Still in significant decline are 
the following: religious belonging, […] church 
attendance, […] and the importance granted to 
God” (Lambert, 2004, p. 33).
-  Examples of similar studies could be multi-
plied, but I will only mention one more study, 
expanding the focus beyond Europe and allow-
ing to appreciate the role of the urban factor. 
A recent study by anthropologist F. Fleisher 
(2007) shows how young adult affluent Chi-
nese urbanites are instantiating a major shift in 
Chinese society today. Their choice for a home, 
a neighbourhood and a circle of friends and 
acquaintances are rapidly being determined by 
lifestyle values, rather than family or tradition. 
Fleischer estimates that this trend is so pervasive 
that it will alter Chinese society in a fundamen-
tal way: we may be witnessing the birth of a 
dual society with one rural society continuing 
to be ordered by tradition and one urban society 
structured by cosmopolitan lifestyle formats. 
Analyzing the examples
The sketchy outline of my own empirical data, and the 
illustrative mention of more systematic empirical studies 
on similar issues, should suffice to give at the very least a 
taste of the issues I want to address. My major intention, 
however, is not to present empirical data, but rather to 
question them along the lines of the three dimensions I 
isolated: urbanization (of the world), cosmopolitics and 
new notions of self.
The typical cosmopolitanism of the ‘believers’ can 
be summed up as follows: the belief system they stand 
for suffices in itself to live as a human being. It is held 
to have the potential to be the right way for all human 
beings. In the literature this feature is often captured by 
claiming a universal status for the particular belief sys-
tem. Indeed, this is an intrinsic feature of the Christian 
and the Muslim (with their zeal of conversion of the 
whole of humanity), which explains their joint efforts 
in example 2. It obtains in a different way for the laicist 
view, with the rather vague statement that a so-called 
‘neutral’ moral and political platform can be defined 
for humanity as a whole (example 4). The nature of this 
‘universality’ is rather particular: in the theologies of the 
Meditterranean religions it is said that God created hu-
mankind and ordered to be obeyed on the basis of a set of 
laws of conduct. The attitude attached to this conviction 
is what holds my attention here: in fact, the attitude is to 
take for granted that ‘what is good/right/true for me is 
good/right/true for all human beings’. So, universality is 
not so much a description of what is factually universal, 
but rather a presupposition of the universal validity of 
what is held to be good/right/true for me. This justifies, 
in the eyes of the religious believers and of the laicist 
the universalization or the universal implementation 
(through conversion or through a discourse on univer-
sal rights) of the particular on a worldwide scale. That 
this attitude yields perverse and decidedly unjustifiable 
results may be illustrated perhaps most forcibly in the 
non-religious applications. 
Thus, Mattei e Nader (2008) investigate how the 
seemingly ‘neutral’ rule of law is presently justifying 
plunder of resources, indeed at a global scale. In Hermans 
e Dimaggio (2004) this universalitic status attributed to 
a world view or a religion is seen as typical for the first 
two stages of the evolution of self in our culture. In the 
first stage, that of the pre-modern era and that of the 
subsequent modern era. In the first stage a moralistic, 
integral and exclusive view is promoted and continued 
through education in this part of the world in the format 
of the Christian worldview (and in other parts of the 
world by Islam). The subsequent modern is reacting 
against the former by claiming a sovereign, mechanistic 
and individualised self. This is best and most elaborately 
expressed in the laicist view. However, the modern self is 
also a master discourse, and in that respect retains essen-
tial features of the pre-modern self: it is THE alternative 
(for humankind), to the religious self and hence excludes 
diversity (as is clearly seen today in the debates on the 
multicultural society in general, and on the headscarf 
in particular). It is only in the post-modern or third era 
that the idea of a universalizable master discourse is 
attacked in principle. In that era different, eventually 
conflicting ‘truths’ exist and are advocated, thus in fact 
moving away from the ambition and even the status of 
universalizable ‘good/right/truth’ (e.g., Derrida is an icon 
for that era). This implies that universalistic claims and 
the understanding that what could be declared universal 
can constitute the core of a cosmopolitan or worldwide 
blueprint. This is exactly the historical identification (or, 
from my perspective, the default) of ‘universality equals 
cosmopolitanism’ which is shared both by the pre-modern 
self and its critic (i.e., the modern self). It is only with 
the post-modern self that this equation is questioned: 
universalibility (intrinsic for the religions of the book and 
for the Enlightement philosophy) is problematized and 
the notion of cosmopolitanism is, obviously, dropped. 
My suggestion is that now, in what Hermans (2004) 




a new cosmopolitanism should be advocated. Indeed, 
after the critical assessment of the world views of the 
pre-modern and the modern era in the post-modern 
view, we now wake up in a world that has become more 
interdependent and more intertwined that ever before, 
also in the consciousness of people (and hence in the 
concept of self that emerges). My point is that, once 
we disconnect cosmopolitanism from universality, we 
can start constructing a different notion and practice of 
cosmopolitics, and at the same time position ourselves 
in a more modest way than that of (selfdeclared) uni-
versality. That is, we can investigate what cosmopolitan 
platform would be feasible, workable and wanted on the 
basis of the comparative assessment and the negotiated 
agreement of what is needed in the world of today. That 
is my first proposal: a notion of cosmopolitanism which 
results from comparison and negotiation in a diverse 
world. Having said all this, it is clear that Hermans’ 
views themselves are still guilty of this old universalism. 
Or put differently, Hermans (2004) seems to presuppose 
that all humankind went through the three stages of self 
to land on the dialogical self planet today. This is not said 
by the author, but there is no sign at all of a comparative 
perspective in his works, so the universalistic pretension 
is implied. It is obvious that this stand should be critically 
assessed: different cultural traditions may well have dif-
ferent notions of self and even different histories of self. 
As far as we know, this is basically unknown country 
(except for a few studies such as Kirkpatrick, Hsu and 
a few others), but universality should at the very least 
be questioned.
The second dimension I want to take into account to 
interpret the data is that of urbanisation. By any measure 
urbanisation (and with it the ICT communication tech-
nology of today) of the present era is rapid, pervasive and 
ever more dominant over the generations. To the extent 
that the traditional belief systems (both the religions of 
the book and the non-believers stand of atheist and ag-
nostic venture) addressed kinship groups and village or 
small city societies (Pinxten e Dikomitis, 2006), it likely 
that these belief systems are not really prepared for or 
even incapable of dealing adequately with the so-called 
impersonal, global and inexorably diverse context of the 
modern urban complex. Whatever one may think, the 
so-called urban context of the past (the pre-modern and 
the modern period which Hermans talks about) saw only 
10% of humankind living in cities in 1900, versus over 
60% one century later. Moreover, the very phenomenon 
of cities of millions is a recent phenomena (having over 
20 cities with 20 million inhabitants or more in 2000: 
Davis, 2007). In this kind of context social, religious and 
cultural diversity is a dominant feature, or put in other 
words: it is essential that city dwellers be able to live 
and cope with difference.
Both the pre-modern and modern self are likely to 
become notions under attack in these contexts. Put 
differently: to the extent that a unique, consistent and 
presumably universalisable worldview is held onto, 
the subject is likely to run into ever more frustration 
or embitterment. In that same context the notion of a 
dialogical self which focuses on the ways to deal with 
difference rather than with identity is a promising one.
The final dimension is that of changes in personhood. 
This point is treated in detail in Hermans (2004), where 
psychotherapeutic and social psychological approaches 
on the dialogical self are investigated. The authors 
make subtle distinctions between the so-called ‘multiple 
personality’ or ‘split person’ syndromes where a person 
‘looses himself in complex situations’ since different 
and/or conflicting aspects of the person are addressed in 
different contexts. In the pre-modern and the modern eras 
the model of a consistent and in a sense self-sufficient 
self could adequately work for subjects living in a mono-
cultural and basically mono-religious cultural context. 
In the present time, where living with difference is rap-
idly becoming the primary challenge, it is to be expected 
that the old notion of person comes under attack as 
well. In my appreciation as an anthropologist, the older 
motions of integral person as they are exemplified to a 
large extent in the examples 1-4, of older people hold-
ing power positions in the so-called - “pillar society” 
of the past decades – are gradually dissipating together 
with the ‘pillar society’. That is to say, even when the 
leadership tries to build fully integrated or consistent 
Christians (example 1), Muslims (example 3) or laicists 
(example 4) the mixed and rapidly changing world of 
experience of these young people seems to bring them 
more and more to a development of a self, composed 
of elements from different world views (example 5). 
The way I interpret this is that a shift is taking place at 
a deeper, maybe subliminal level: young people seem 
to ‘go shopping’ in world view material and not to cure 
too much about ideological consistency: they take a bit 
of Christianity (especially for the rites of passage), a bit 
of laicist views (e.g. on abortion and euthanasia, regard-
less of their religious belonging), a bit of Buddhism or 
New Age (e.g., some meditation), and so on. This calls 
for a new procedure and the theory of the dialogical self 
seems especially appropriate here. However, to the extent 
that the developing a self is a process of socialization 
and enculturation, the notion of person with used here is 
important. My proposal is that a shifte may be happening 
here as well: the mono-cultural consistent person is a self 
growing from a non-person to a 100% person through the 
249
Cosmopolitics and the dialogical self
volume 22, número 4, outubro • dezembro 2018
series of initiation rites (from e.g. baptism to marriage). 
In the new predicament the more adequate perspective, 
in line with the notion of the dialogical self, is that of 
the deployment of a self of at the most a partial person: 
One is a man as a partial person, thus recognizing not to 
be a woman, but leaving the exploration of the feminine 
open. One’s also a Frenchman as a partial person, and 
hence not a Turk or a Chinese, but leaving openings 
again for the selves one is not. In terms of education and 
of positioning oneself in mixed and changing world, the 
notion of the partial person seems more promising and 
less frustrating than the old notion of the ‘full person’ 
who is Christian, atheist, or whatever in a consistent and 
exclusive way. In that perspective I understand the notion 
of dialogical self as indeed an adequate mechanism in 
the contexts of the contemporary person.
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